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Abstract
We study social learning by boundedly rational agents. Agents take a decision in sequence,
after observing their predecessors and a private signal. They are unable to understand their
predecessors’ decisions in their ﬁnest details: they only understand the relation between the
aggregate distribution of actions and the state of nature. We show that, in a continuous action
space, compared to the rational case, agents put more weight on early signals. Despite this
behavioral bias, beliefs converge to the truth. In a discrete action space, instead, convergence
to the truth does not occur even if agents receive signals of unbounded precisions.
1 Introduction
In many economic and social situations, people learn from observing the decisions of others. While
they learn from others, they can even decide to imitate what others do, and follow the crowd.
Indeed, a central message of the social learning literature (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al.,
1992) is that perfectly rational agents can decide to neglect their private information (on which
action is the most proﬁtable) and simply herd on the decisions of previous decision makers. The
rationale for this result is simple. Suppose agents must choose in a set of discrete actions. The
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1actions taken by other agents may be based on the private information that these agents had.
When a suﬃcient number of agents have made the same decision and consensus has arisen, the
public information revealed by these actions overwhelms the next agent’s private information and
this agent will ﬁnd it optimal to conform to the majority.
While the social learning literature oﬀers many insightful results, it also reaches some unsettling
conclusions. The argument we have illustrated above goes through in the full rationality paradigm
when agents’ action space is discrete and the private signals agents receive have bounded precision.
With a continuous action space, the process of social learning is, instead, eﬃcient when agents are
fully rational (see Lee, 1993). The continuous action space allows the agents to ﬁne tune their
actions to their expectations, thereby allowing the following agents to infer perfectly the signals
from the observation of the previous actions. As a result, all private information is perfectly
aggregated. In this setting, history does not matter, in two senses: the action of the immediate
predecessor already contains all the public information an agent needs to make the optimal decision;
the actions of the early agents in the sequence do not have any long lasting eﬀect on the decisions
of the following decision makers.
The process of social learning is eventually eﬃcient even in the discrete action space case, as
long as signals can have unbounded precision and agents are fully rational (see Smith and Sørensen,
2000). In this case, even if a “herd” of one million people occurs, the decision of the next agent
with a very precise signal to go against the herd overturns the weight of the long sequence of
predecessors, thus allowing the followers to take advantage of his precise information. This is what
Smith and Sørensen (2000) refer to as the overturning principle.
Some of the conclusions reached in the full rationality paradigm sound unintuitive. For example,
it does not sound fully convincing that human subjects would make the right inference after seeing
one breaking a long herd in Smith and Sørensen’s model, nor does it sound fully convincing that
human subjects would perfectly infer the sequence of past signals just by observing past actions in
Lee’s continuous action space model. There are several routes to approach this: either modify some
aspects of the game while maintaining the rationality assumptions,1 or stick to the original game
and try to propose alternative approaches (say with bounded rationality) to model the interaction.
1Smith and Sørensen (2008), for instance, to overcome the overturning principle, dispense with the assumption of
perfect observability of the history of actions and propose a model in which agents only observe unordered samples
from past history.
2We follow the second route with the view that no matter what the most realistic social learning
model is, it is likely that the type of inferences required in the full rationality paradigm goes beyond
what real subjects can reasonably be expected to do.2
We note that the second route can itself be decomposed into several alternative approaches.
For example, one can propose heuristic views on how subjects make their inferences in each speciﬁc
social learning model, or one can view the subjects as making their inferences based on some partial
yet correct understanding of the problem. It is the latter approach that we pursue here. Speciﬁcally,
we develop an equilibrium approach in which agents make their inferences from what they observe
based only on the knowledge of how the state of the world aﬀects the distribution of actions. In
simple words, this means that each agent understands the frequency with which each action is taken
in a given state of the world, but does not understand how the frequency of the action depends on
the speciﬁc history of decisions and on the private signals that agents receive. It is an equilibrium
approach because the understanding of the agents even though partial is assumed to be correct.
We apply our approach both to the continuous and to discrete action space set ups. Key ﬁndings
are that history does matter even in a continuous action space, and that the overturning principle
does not hold when signals are of unbounded precision.
An important motivation for the type of partial understanding that we are assuming is that
looking at previous social learning experiences it is probably easier to remember (or have access
to data on) how actions are distributed as a function of the state of the world (which is often
observable ex post) than to know how actions depend on the private history of decisions (which
is often not even accessible).3 In other words, from a (repeated game) learning perspective, it
seems plausible that agents can learn the relation between the state of the world and the frequency
of actions, whereas they may ﬁnd it diﬃcult (or impossible, for lack of observation) to learn the
relation between the actions and the private information available to agents. Besides, it may be
argued that in a number of real life social learning interactions, subjects do not know the exact
structure of information and preferences that applies to others, thereby making other forms of
inferences either based on heuristic or introspective reasoning less reliable.
A simple, informal example will serve to clarify the concept. Imagine we run an experiment on
2For example, if along with Smith and Sorensen (2008), we assume the order of moves is not observed, the rational
inferences in such a model are even more complex than in the standard model.
3Such a motivation is related to the theme of robust mechanism design (Bergmann and Morris, 2005) which
explicitly acknowledges that beliefs of agents are not easily accessible.
3the standard model of Bikhchandani et al. (1992). A group of subjects have to choose in sequence
either action “a” or action “b.” Before making their decision, they receive a signal on whether the
true state of the world is A or B. Then they choose in sequence, after observing the predecessors’
actions. The experiment is repeated many times. After each repetition, each agent is informed of
the true state of the world and of his payoﬀ (which depends only on the state of the world and on his
chosen action). Suppose now at the end of the experiment, we consider all the repetitions in which
the state of the world was A. We count the total number of “a” actions and of “b” actions (in all
periods) and ﬁnd out that action “a” was chosen 67% of the time, while action “b” was chosen 33%
of the time. When the state of the world was B, instead, action “a” was chosen 35% of the time and
action “b” 65%. Given these empirical frequencies, how would you play in this experiment if you
had the possibility of participating in it? Our equilibrium concept assumes that agents expect that
the probabilities of actions “a” and “b” being chosen are equal to these frequencies, independently
of the time when the action is taken (and the speciﬁc sequence that the agent has observed until
then). Moreover, agents best respond to these “frequencies,” by which we mean that they choose
the best action assuming other’s actions in state ω = A or B are distributed according to these
aggregate frequencies no matter what was observed. These actions in turn generate new data and
assuming long run convergence of the overall process, the aggregate empirical frequencies provided
to subjects should be correct, thereby motivating the equilibrium approach pursued in this paper.
Formally, our analysis is based on the concept of Analogy Based Expectation Equilibrium, de 
veloped by Jehiel (2005). We particularize the analogy based expectation equilibrium by assuming
that there are two analogy classes, one for each state of the world. This partition is referred to as
the payoﬀ relevant analogy partition, given that each agent’s ﬁnal payoﬀ depends on the state of
the world and his action and nothing else. In an Analogy Based Expectation Equilibrium, agents
expect others to play according to the same mixed distribution in each state of the economy (irre 
spective of the history observed by the agent). Upon observing actions, agents update their beliefs
(about the state of the economy) assuming other agents behave according to such state dependent
mixed distributions. Moreover, the state dependent mixed distributions considered by the agents
are assumed to coincide with the aggregate distribution of play in the corresponding state of the
economy, a consistency requirement which is viewed as the outcome of a learning process. We will
refer to this model of bounded rationality as the payoﬀ relevant reasoning model.
We start our analysis with the case of a continuous action space in which agents seek to choose
4an action as close as possible to what they think the state is. In the standard (Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium) analysis, the process of social learning is eﬃcient (Lee, 1993): each action reveals the
signal realization with the result that agent at time t acts as if he had observed all previous t − 1
signals (plus, obviously, his own signal). We show that, instead, in our equilibrium, a behavioral
bias arises in that agents give more weight to early signals than to later ones: in particular, the
agent moving at time t chooses an action as if signal 1 had weight t −1, signal 2 had weight t −2,
etc.4 Despite this bias, however, over time the beliefs converge almost surely to the truth and, as
a result, actions converge to the correct one. Furthermore, convergence occurs at an exponential
rate, exactly as in the standard analysis. In other words, even though the coarse inference implies
that early actions have a disproportionate eﬀect on subsequent decisions, our boundedly rational
agents learn in the long run, as it occurs in the model with fully rational agents. We show that
these basic insights are robust to various extensions of the model with continuous action space (e.g.,
the case in which only some predecessors’ actions are observed, and that in which the order of play
in unknown).
We then move to study the case of a discrete action space in which the signals can be of
unbounded precision. In contrast to the insights found with full rationality, we show that, under
the payoﬀ relevant reasoning model, the probability that the agents settle on the correct action
and beliefs converge to the truth is bounded away from one. Such asymptotic ineﬃciencies occur
because in our model when an agent breaks a herd, it is unlikely that subsequent agents will follow
this deviator for they miss the inference that the deviator must have received a very precise signal.
A summary of our asymptotic results is as follows. While in the full rationality case, either the
continuous action space or the unbounded precision of signals guarantee the convergence of beliefs
to the truth, in the payoﬀ relevant reasoning model we ﬁnd that convergence to the truth obtains
in the continuous action space case but not in the unbounded precision case.
Almost all the literature on social learning assumes full rationality. Nevertheless, our approach
to bounded rationality is obviously not the only one that can be applied to study social learning.
If agents were fully cursed, as modelled in Eyster and Rabin (2005), they would base their decision
solely on their own signals, as others’ actions would be (wrongly) thought to be uninformative
about the state of the world. The result would be that the beliefs would not converge to the truth
4Signal 1 has weight t−1 in the sense that the choice of action is the same as the one that would have been made
by a rational agent observing t − 1 independent draws of that signal realization. Similarly for the other signals.
5and decisions would not settle on a particular action. More generally, if agents were partially cursed
(as deﬁned in Eyster and Rabin, 2005), early signals could not have more eﬀects than later signals
on subsequent actions. Such results should be contrasted with our ﬁnding in the continuous action
space model that early signals have signiﬁcantly more impact than later signals on current decisions
when agents rely on the payoﬀ relevant model of reasoning.5
Elaborating on their previous work, in a recent paper, Eyster and Rabin (2008) consider a
framework in which agents wrongly believe that other players are cursed, whereas they are not,
which combines ideas from the cursed equilibrium and the subjective prior paradigms. It turns
out that in a framework with continuous action and signal space, this approach coincides with a
heuristic approach in which subjects would interpret past actions as if they were signals of various
precisions.6 A striking result they obtain is that early signals are overwhelmingly inﬂuential,
leading to asymptotic ineﬃciencies. In our model with continuous action space, instead, despite
the behavioral bias that assigns a higher weight to early signals, eventually beliefs converge to the
true state of nature and actions settle on the correct one.
Other models of social learning with bounded rationality include Bala and Goyal (1998), De
Marzo et al. (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993). In Bala and Goyal
(1998), agents in a network choose after observing their neighbors’ actions and payoﬀs. There
is private information in their model, but agents are assumed to ignore it to some extent. By
assumption, each agent learns from his neighbor’s actions (experiments) but does not ask what
information might have led the neighbor to choose those actions. De Marzo et al. (2003) and
Acemoglu et al. (2009) also focus on networks, but learning in these models is non Bayesian. In
Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) agents consider the experiences of their neighbors and learn using
rules of thumb. In some cases, even naive rules can lead to eﬃcient decisions, but adjustment to
an innovation can be slow.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the economy with a continuous action
space and we deﬁne our solution concept. In Section 3 we illustrate the main equilibrium analysis.
5Note that the fully cursed equilibrium can be viewed as an analogy based expectation equilibrium in which
agents use the private information analogy partition (see Jehiel and Koessler, 2008). The contrast between the
results reveals how much extra ﬂexibility is allowed by varying the analogy partitions. We believe the payoﬀ relevant
analogy partition is more suited to the analysis of social learning given also that it allows for some form of non trivial
inference unlike the private information analogy partition.
6With a continuous signal space, every action can be interpreted that way.
6In Section 4 we present the asymptotic properties of the economy. In Section 5 we elaborate on
existence and uniqueness issues. In Section 6, we illustrate extensions of the model. In Section
7 we study the case of a discrete action space. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains the
proofs not presented in the text.
2 The Model
In our economy there are T agents who have to make a decision in sequence. Time is discrete
and indexed by t = 1,2,...,T. The sequential order in which agents act is exogenously, randomly
determined. Each agent, indexed by t, is chosen to take an action only once, at time t (in other
worlds agents are numbered according to their position).
Agent t takes an action at in the action space [0,1]. The agent’s payoﬀ, depends on his choice
and on the true state of the world ω ∈ {0,1}. We assume that the payoﬀ is quadratic and, in
particular, equal to −(ω − at)2. Each agent t receives a private signal st ∈ {0,1} correlated with
the true state ω. In particular, he receives a symmetric binary signal distributed as follows:





with qt  = qt′ for any t  = t′. This means that, conditional on the state of the world, the signals are
independent but not identically distributed over time. We will refer to the ratio
Pr(si|ω=1)
Pr(si|ω=0) as the






the following (genericity) assumption:8







= 1, then ni = 0 for all i. (A1)
Agents know the precision of their own signal, as well as the precision of the others’ signals.9
In addition to observing a private signal, each agent observes the sequence of actions taken by the
predecessors. We denote the history of actions until time t−1 by ht, that is, ht = {a1,a2,...,at−1}.10
We denote the set of such histories by Ht. Agent t’s information set is then represented by the
7To simplify the exposition, we use the same symbol to indicate a random variable and its realization.




9We make this assumption only to present our model in its simplest version, the closest to the standard social
learning model. We will see later that agents need not be aware of the precision of others’ signals for our results to
hold.
10Note that h1 = ∅.
7couple (ht,st). Given the information (ht,st), the agent will choose at to maximize the expected
payoﬀ ESUBJ[−(ω − at)2|ht,st]. Therefore, the optimal action will be a∗
t = ESUBJ[ω|ht,st]. We
use the superscript “SUBJ” in the expectation to emphasize that each agent forms a subjective
expectation. We discuss the way in which this is done in the next subsection. For the time being,
observe that the above considerations imply that we can restrict attention to pure strategies (given
that ESUBJ[ω|ht,st] reduces to the choice of a single action).
2.1 Equilibrium Concept
We depart from the standard approach in one essential aspect, that is, in modelling how agents
form expectations about their opponents’ strategies. We adopt the Analogy Based Expectation
Equilibrium concept ﬁrst introduced by Jehiel (2005) using, more speciﬁcally, the payoﬀ relevant
analogy partition (see Jehiel and Koessler, 2008). We assume that agents are unable to understand
the other agents’ strategies in their ﬁnest details, thereby making it impossible for them to assess
how the choice of action depends on the public history and the private signal at every date t.
Instead, agents are assumed to make their inferences from past play based only on the knowledge
of how the state of the world ω aﬀects the distribution of actions. This is referred to as the payoﬀ 
relevant analogy partition given that ﬁnal payoﬀs depend on the state of the world ω and the
actions but not on the signals directly.
Formally, let us denote a strategy proﬁle by σ, that is, σ = (σ1,σ2,...σT), where an agent’s
strategy σt maps (ht,st) into an action, that is, σt : Ht × {0,1} → [0,1]. With a slight abuse
of notation, σt(a|ht,st) denotes the probability that agent t picks action a when the history is ht
and the signal is st. Since, as already mentioned, equilibria in pure strategies will be considered,
σt(a|ht,st) will either be equal to 0 or to 1. Given a particular strategy proﬁle σ in pure strategies,
we denote by  σ(ht,st|ω) the probability that history ht is realized and st is the signal at t when
ω is the state of the world. Observe that because st takes values in {0,1} and the strategies σt are
pure,  σ(ht,st|ω) > 0 only for ﬁnitely many (ht,st).











This is a mixed distribution that assigns positive weight to those actions that are played after some
(ht,st), and the weight assigned to σt(a|ht,st) is proportional to  σ(ht,st|ω), as required from a
8learning story in which agents would have learned from past interactions the distribution of actions
as a function of the state ω.11
Given that, for each t,
 








In an Analogy Based Expectation Equilibrium, every agent t assumes that other agents choose
action a with probability σ(a|ω) when the state is ω, and that these behaviors are randomized
independently across periods. Furthermore, agent t believes that the signal st is independent of
the actions of his predecessors. He chooses a best response accordingly:12
Deﬁnition 1 An Analogy Based Expectation Equilibrium with payoﬀ-relevant analogy partitions
(ABEE) is a strategy proﬁle σ such that for every t, σt is a best response to the conjecture that
other agents follow the strategy σ as deﬁned in (1), and that, conditional on ω, agent t’s signal st
is independent of his predecessors’ actions.
At an interpretative level, we see the ABEE as representing a steady state of a learning process
and not as a result of introspective reasoning. The consistency required by the equilibrium concept
should thus be viewed as the outcome of a dynamic process in which agents would eventually know
how actions are distributed as a function of the state the economy. Such a learning process only
requires that agents be informed of the state of the world as well as of the actions chosen in previous
plays (together with the structure of their own payoﬀs and the precision of their own signal). Agents
need not have a prior knowledge about the payoﬀs or information structure of other players, nor of
their ways of reasoning.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
At a ﬁrst glance, ﬁnding an ABEE seems rather complicated. Deﬁnition 1 involves a ﬁxed point
argument (σt is a best response to σ and σ is derived from the various σt through (1)), which
11Note that the aggregate distribution is obtained considering all periods, not only the preceding periods, since
agents bundle all decision nodes in the two analogy classes.
12Compared to the framework developed in Jehiel and Koessler (2008), there are a few diﬀerences. First, we
consider a multi stage, multi player setup, whereas Jehiel and Koessler consider two person, simultaneous move
games. Second, the analogy partitions as deﬁned above include the decision nodes of all players and not just those
of the other players.
9could make the analysis diﬃcult. One could also suspect that there are multiple ABEE. As we will
see (in Section 5), generically there is only one ABEE and it corresponds to the strategy proﬁle
constructed below.
Let us start the construction of an ABEE. Letting α(s1,s2,...,sk) denote the equilibrium action
taken after the sequence of signal realizations (s1,s2,...,sk), we conjecture that the agents’ strategies








Note that this requirement comprises both the case in which k = l and st  = s′
t for at least one
t = 1,2,..,k, and the case in which k  = l. Given this conjecture, we construct an equilibrium and,
then, we verify that it satisﬁes the conjecture.
Speciﬁcally, consider a sequence of signals (s1,s2,..,sT) received by agents 1,2,..,T. At time 1,









Therefore, agent 1 will choose the action α(s1) such that
α(s1)
1−α(s1) = m(s1). That is, he chooses
action a1 = q1 if s1 = 1, and a1 = 1 − q1 if s1 = 0.
Consider now agent 2. After observing action a1 = α(s1) and the private signal s2, agent 2




σ(a1|ω = 1)Pr(s2|ω = 1)
σ(a1|ω = 0)Pr(s2|ω = 0)
.





T . Given our conjecture that α(s1) is diﬀerent
from any other α(s′
1,...s′
l), the probability of action a = q1 (a = 1 − q1) is equal to one for the
sequence {s1 = 1} ({s1 = 0}) and zero for any other sequence of signal realizations. This implies
that
σ(a = q1|ω) =






σ(a = 1 − q1|ω) =













13Note that α(s1,s2,...,sk) is well deﬁned, given that the equilibrium involves pure strategies.




The actions chosen by agents 1 and 2 are the same as in the standard case (as we will see
in the next subsection). This ceases to be the case for the subsequent actions chosen in periods
t ≥ 3. Consider agent 3: after receiving the signal s3 and observing the history a1 = α(s1) and




σ(a1|ω = 1)σ(a2|ω = 1)
σ(a1|ω = 0)σ(a2|ω = 0)
m(s3).
The probability of observing action a2 = α(s1,s2) in state ω is just the probability that in state ω
the signals in dates 1 and 2 are s1 and s2, as for any other date and/or signal realization the action
would be diﬀerent (given our conjecture). It follows that
σ(a2|ω) =

















Note that signal s1 is “counted” twice in this expression, ﬁrst for the inference from action
α(s1) and then for the inference from action α(s1,s2).14 The inference from α(s1) is standard. The
double counting is the direct consequence of the agent bundling states into analogy classes and only
considering the aggregate behavior in the two classes.
A similar reasoning applies to any time t. After observing a1 = α(s1),.., at−1 = α(s1,...st−1)









Pr(s1|ω = 1)Pr(s1,s2|ω = 1)   Pr(s1,s2,..,st−1|ω = 1)
Pr(s1|ω = 0)Pr(s1,s2|ω = 0)   Pr(s1,s2,..,st−1|ω = 0)
m(st),
14The signal is “counted” twice in the sense that the choice of action is the same as the one that would have been
made by a rational agent observing two independend draws of that signal realization.
11where the second equality follows from our conjecture that all α’s are diﬀerent.
In this updating, signal s1 is counted t − 1 times, signal s2 is counted t − 2 times and so on.













To conclude, note that, given our genericity assumption (A1), our conjecture that all α’s are
diﬀerent is satisﬁed, which implies that we have just found an ABEE.16
We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There exists an ABEE in which, after a sequence of signals s1,s2,...,st, agent t
chooses action a∗
















In the above proposition, the strategy of agent t is not explicitly constructed as a function of
the history and of agent t’s private signal. Yet, such a strategy is easily determined for the histories
{a1,a2,..,at−1} such that a1 = α(s1),a2 = α(s1,s2)....at−1 = α(s1,s2...st−1) and by the signal st,
by identifying the strategy σt(a|a1,a2,..,at−1,st) with the choice of the action a = α(s1,s2,...,st)
with probability 1. For other histories, the strategy is not speciﬁed, but this is irrelevant for the
analysis of the equilibrium path.17
3.1 A Benchmark: The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Before we continue our analysis, it is worth contrasting the result in Proposition 1 with what
happens in the case in which agents are fully rational. The analog of Proposition 1 for the case of
fully rational agents writes (see Lee, 1993, for a detailed analysis):
Proposition 2 There exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In the PBE, after














15Note that, throughout the paper, we use the convention that Π
0
i=1x
i is equal to 1.
16¿From this construction it should be clear that agents need not know the precisions of other agents’ signals
(neither they need to know their realizations, of course). Indeed, the equilibrium is constructed considering the
aggregate distributions given the states of the world, which does not require knowledge of others’ precisions.
17Obviously, that presented above is only our way (i.e., the modelers’ way) of constructing the equilibrium strategies.
Boundedly rational agents do not go through our steps of reasoning to choose their actions. On the contrary, our
interpretation is that they learn σ (and so act according to our formula in Proposition 1) simply through repeated
play of the game, as discussed above.
12In the PBE, agents can perfectly infer the signals observed by their predecessors from their
choices of actions. As a result agents pick the action that corresponds to the expected value of the
state of the world conditional on the signals received by themselves and all their predecessors.18
The comparison between Propositions 1 and 2 makes it very easy to appreciate the diﬀerence
between the two approaches. Essentially, while in the ABEE earlier signals receive a higher weight,
in a PBE they all have the same weight. To see what diﬀerence this can make, let us present a
simple example.
3.2 An Example
For illustration, let us consider an example with T = 5. The ﬁve agents receive a private signal of
precision q1 = 0.95, q2 = 0.9, q3 = 0.85, q4 = 0.8, and q5 = 0.75. Moreover, let us assume that the
ﬁrst agent receives a signal equal to 0 and the remaining four agents a signal equal to 1.
The ﬁrst agent does not have a problem of learning from others. He receives the signal s1 = 0
and computes his likelihood ratio as
Pr(ω = 1|s1 = 0)
Pr(ω = 0|s1 = 0)
=
Pr(s1 = 0|ω = 1)





As a result, he chooses a∗
1 = E[ω|s1 = 0] = 0.05.
The second agent observes a∗
1 and forms his likelihood ratio
Pr(ω = 1|s2 = 1,a1 = 0.05)






(1 − 0.05)(1 − 0.9)
= 0.47368,
which implies that he chooses a∗
2 = ESUBJ[ω|h1 = {0.05},s2 = 1] = 0.32143.
Now, let us consider agent 3. After observing (h3,s3) = ({0.05,0.32143},1), his a likelihood
ratio is
18Also in the case of the PBE agents do not need to know the other agents’ signal precisions. The reason is quite
diﬀerent from the case of the ABEE, though. Here the knowledge is not required since rational agents can infer the
precision of the signals (as well as their realizations) from the observation of the sequence of actions.
13Pr(ω = 1|a∗
1 = 0.05,a∗
2 = 0.32143,s3 = 1)
Pr(ω = 0|a∗
1 = 0.05,a∗
2 = 0.32143,s3 = 1)
=
σ(0.05|ω = 1)σ(0.32143|ω = 1)
σ(0.05|ω = 0)σ(0.32143|ω = 0)
m(s3 = 1) =
(0.05)
2 (0.9)(0.85)
(1 − 0.05)2(1 − 0.9)(1 − 0.85)
= 0.14127.
This implies that his action is a∗
3 = 0.12378. Similarly, agent 4 observes (h4,s4) = ({0.05,0.32143,0.12378},1),
has a likelihood ratio of 0.26768, and his optimal action is a∗
4 = 0.21116. Finally, agent 5, after
observing (h5,s5) = ({0.05,0.32143,0.12378,0.21116},1), has a likelihood equal to 2.1555, and
chooses a∗
5 = 0.68309.
For comparison, note that in the PBE, while agents 1 and 2 would make exactly the same
decisions as in our model (aPBE
1 = a∗
1 = 0.05, aPBE
2 = a∗
2 = 0.32143), agents 3, 4 and 5 would not,
since they would update their beliefs diﬀerently. In particular, agent 3’s likelihood ratios would be
(0.05)(0.9)(0.85)
(1 − 0.05)(1 − 0.9)(1 − 0.85)
= 2.6842,
and, similarly, agent 4 and agent 5’s likelihood ratios would be 10.737 and 32.211, which implies
that they would choose aPBE
3 = 0.72857, aPBE
4 = 0.91480, and aPBE
5 = 0.96989.
The diﬀerence between the predictions of the two models is striking in this example. In the
PBE, at time 5, after four good signals and one bad signal the optimal action is close to 1. In our
ABEE, in contrast, due to the high weight that agent 5 gives to the ﬁrst negative realization, it is
lower than 0.7. Moreover, in the PBE, since the signal realizations following the ﬁrst are all good,
the optimal action is monotonically increasing: agents become more and more convinced that the
true state of the world is ω = 1. This contrasts with the ABEE, where agent 3 chooses an action
lower than agent 2. The result is due to agent 3 double counting the bad realization of the signal
that led agent 1 to choose 0.05, while agent 2 updates his belief counting it only once.
Clearly, in this example, the diﬀerence between the two equilibria is particularly strong due to
our choice of a history in which the ﬁrst signal (which always carries more weight) is diﬀerent from
the others, and, furthermore, is the one with the highest precision. For other histories and other
parameter values, the diﬀerences may be less striking, yet they never disappear.
144 Behavioral Bias and Long Run Convergence
The behavioral bias we have identiﬁed implies that if early in the history of play agents receive
the incorrect signals, this will have a more severe eﬀect on future actions in an ABEE than in the
PBE, since these signals receive more weight. A natural question is whether this eﬀect will persist
over time, so that beliefs may converge to the wrong value, or whether, eventually, despite the
behavioral bias, convergence of beliefs to the truth obtains. And if convergence obtains, obviously
we are also interested in whether boundedly rational agents learn as fast as rational agents do.
The answer to these questions is that in our ABEE beliefs converge almost surely to the true
state of the world and, eventually, actions settle on the correct one. Furthermore, convergence
occurs exponentially fast in our ABEE as it does in the PBE. These results are reported in the next
proposition, where, for tractability, we restrict attention to the limit case in which the precisions
of signals tend to be all identical and equal to q. To introduce the proposition, we ﬁrst denote
the public belief at time t by Bt := Pr(ω = 1|ht), and the subjective public belief (i.e., the
belief of a boundedly rational agent after observing the history, but before receiving his signal)
by BSUBJ
t := PrSUBJ(ω = 1|ht). In other words, Bt and BSUBJ
t are the public belief in a PBE
and an ABEE, respectively. Observe that these beliefs are independent of the total duration
T, as can be inferred from Propositions 1 and 2. In the next proposition we analyze how Bt
and BSUBJ




t and Zt :=
￿t
i=1 ui
t(t+1)/2, where the random variables ui are distributed as follows:
Pr(ui = i|ω = 1) = Pr(ui = 0|ω = 0) = q, Pr(ui = 0|ω = 1) = Pr(ui = i|ω = 0) = 1 − q. The
random variable Xt is the average number of signals 1 realized until time t (included). Since in the
PBE the observation of each action is equivalent to the observation of each signal, Xt summarizes
the public belief at time t + 1 in the PBE. In an ABEE, at time t + 1, the subjective public belief
is obtained by counting the ﬁrst signal t times, the second t−1 times, etc. These are the numbers
taken by the random variable ui (for i = t, t−1,...) when the ﬁrst signal takes value ut
t , the second
signal takes value
ut−1
t−1 , etc. Therefore, Zt summarizes the subjective public belief at time t + 1 in
our ABEE. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Consider the limit case in which the precisions of all signals tend to the same value
q ∈ (0.5,1). In both the ABEE and the PBE the public belief converges almost surely to the true
state of the world, that is, when ω = 1, BSUBJ
t
a.s. → 1, and Bt
a.s. → 1(and, similarly, when ω = 0,
15BSUBJ
t
a.s. → 0, and Bt
a.s. → 0). Moreover, in both cases, convergence obtains exponentially fast, that
is, Pr(|Xt − q| > ε) ≤ 2e−2tε2
and Pr(|Zt − q| > ε) ≤ 2e−tK(ε)ε2
, where K(ε) is the value of K that
solves the equation (q + ε)K = log
 
(1 − q) + qeK 
.
Despite the bias in our ABEE, the signals are taken into account in the choice of each action.
Since the distribution of signals is markedly diﬀerent in the two states, eventually the true state
of the world is discovered almost surely. Given that early signals receive a higher weight, clearly,
for histories in which early signal realizations happen not to be representative of the true state,
convergence will be slowed down. If the early signal realizations are representative of the state,
instead, convergence will be faster. Our proposition shows that, for almost all sequences of signal
realizations, the bias does not aﬀect the form of long run convergence, since it occurs exponentially
in the ABEE as it does in the PBE. Our boundedly rational agents learn in the long run, as
fully rational agents do. To gain further intuition on this result, it is useful to note the following.
Consider the ﬁrst n consecutive signals. We know from the analysis of the standard case that
when n is large enough, the probability that the diﬀerence between q and the frequency of signal
realizations 1 in state ω = 1 (0 in state ω = 0) is higher than ε is exponentially small in n.
Now, in our ABEE, at time t > n the ﬁrst signal is counted t − 1 times and the n th signal is
counted t−n times. When t grows large, the diﬀerent weight between the ﬁrst and the n th signal
becomes, however, negligible since (t−n)/t approximates 1. In other words, since the over counting
determined by the bias takes a polynomial form, it vanishes in the limit and convergence takes an
exponential form in the ABEE as it does in the PBE.
Figure 1 here
We have simulated the model for various parameter values. Figure 1 shows the average distance
of the public belief from the true state of the world (i.e., |Pr(ω|ht) − ω| and |PrSUBJ(ω|ht) − ω|)
in the case in which all signals are drawn randomly from the interval (0.69, 0.71). The average
distance at any time t is taken over 100,000 replications.19 Essentially this ﬁgure is a graphical
representation of our proposition. The two graphs in the ﬁgure are almost overlapping, indicating
that the long run properties of our ABEE are not dissimilar from those of the PBE.
19We have used this same number of repetitions also for the other simulations presented below.
16Figure 2 here
Figure 2 shows the average distance between belief and fundamental in the ABEE and the
PBE, conditional on the ﬁrst ﬁve signals being incorrect. In the PBE, starting at time 6, when
signal realizations are randomly drawn (from the same interval as before, and, therefore, are correct
approximately 70% of the repetitions), the belief starts approaching the true state of the world:
the distance between belief and state of the world decreases quickly and monotonically. The graph
for the ABEE looks rather diﬀerent. First, after the ﬁrst wrong signals, the agents become almost
certain of the wrong state of the world (the distance is close to 1). After time 5, despite signals are
now correct with frequency close to 70%, the diﬀerence between subjective public belief and the
true state of the world remains close to one. This is because agents put more and more weight on
early signals. It takes 25 periods before the impact of the ﬁrst signals is oﬀset by the later signals
and the belief starts converging to the truth.
While Figures 1 and 2 were obtained for the case in which the q’s are all close to 0.7, we have
run further simulations for the case in which q would be drawn according to a uniform distribution
between 0.5 and 1, and we have obtained very similar graphs, thereby suggesting that the results
on convergence summarized in our proposition extend beyond the limit case of identical precisions.
To conclude this section, let us observe that the inability of agents to understand the ﬁne
details of the inference problem from the predecessors’ actions could lead, in principle, to diﬀerent
predictions. For instance, suppose agents essentially ignore the information content of past history.
Then, we would observe no convergence of actions (even though a Bayesian external observer would,
of course, learn the true state of the world). On the other hand, suppose agents put a lot of weight
on previous actions. Then they may be prone to a sort of herding and, although actions would
settle, there would be no information aggregation. We view our results as somehow in between
these two extremes. In our model, coarse inference does determine a behavioral bias. This, however,
does not preclude the aggregation of information, which actually occurs as in a world of rational
agents.
This is in sharp contrast with what happens if subjects use the heuristic reasoning that upon
observing action a ∈ (1
2,1) of one of his predecessors, the agent believes this corresponds to an
independent signal s = 1 having precision q(a) such that
q(a)
1−q(a) = a. In this case (which corresponds
to the case studied in Eyster and Rabin, 2008), the weight of the ﬁrst signal is approximately equal
17to the sum of the weights of all other signals and, given the overwhelming weight of the early signals
(which may be wrong), there must be asymptotic ineﬃciencies.
5 On Existence and Uniqueness of ABEE
In Section 3 we have constructed an ABEE under the genericity assumption (A1). In this section we
want to understand, more generally, whether there are other ABEE and what happens if assumption
(A1) is violated. The main message will be that, generically, the ABEE constructed in Section 3 is
unique; moreover, when (A1) is violated, there is no guarantee that an ABEE exists.
We will proceed in the following way. We will ﬁrst discuss, in Section 5.1, how to construct an
ABEE generally, and, then, we will move to the issue of the uniqueness. In Section 5.2, we will
discuss the issue of the non existence along with the case of equal precisions of signals.
5.1 Construction of an ABEE and uniqueness
To start our construction of an ABEE, recall that a∗
t = ESUBJ[ω|ht,st], which means that for any
(ht,st) the best response reduces to the choice of a single action. Although agents do not observe
others’ private signals, each action a∗
t is taken after a sequence of private signals (s1,s2,..,st). This
means that also for any (s1,s2,..,st) the best response reduces to the choice of a single action. We
denote this choice in a candidate ABEE by α(s1,s2,..,st).
Let us now deﬁne the set Ψ = {(s1,...,st)|t = 1,2,...T} of all (2 + ... + 2T−1 + 2T) possible
sequences of signal realizations. Given this set, let us deﬁne the partition P(Ψ) whose elements
P are such that if (s1,s2,..,st) ∈ P and (s′
1,s′
2,..,s′




In particular, we deﬁne P(a) = {(s1,s2,..,st)|α(s1,s2,..,st) = a, t = 1,2,...,T} as the set of all
sequences of signal realizations after which an agent chooses the same action a.
We now show that all ABEE can be constructed in the following way: 1) conjecture a speciﬁc
partition P(Ψ); 2) compute the actions chosen after each sequence of signal realizations; 3) ﬁnally,
verify that the conjecture is satisﬁed. In our construction in Section 3 we used the ﬁnest partition
in which each P(a)  = 0 is a singleton. We now consider the general case in which the P(a)  = 0 are
not necessarily singletons.









































(s1,s2,..,st)∈P(a)(1 − q1(s1))(1 − q2(s2))...(1 − qt(st))
,
where qi(si) is equal to qi if si = 1 and to 1 − qi if si = 0.
Given these likelihood ratios, one can obtain the actions α(s1), α(s1,s2),..., α(s1,s2,..,st).
Then, for this to be an equilibrium, one has to verify that these actions are measurable with
respect to the partitions, that is, α(s1,s2,..,st) = α(s′
1,s′
2,..,s′




t′) belong to the same partition P(a∗).
Now that we have illustrated the general construction of an ABEE, let us turn to the uniqueness
issue. From this construction, we can show that the ABEE is generically unique. To see this, let























and let Q =
 
j Qj, and let zk’s be elements of Q. Note that, for any T, the sets Qj’s are ﬁnite since
so is any Cj(Ψ). The (subjective) likelihood ratio that any agent t forms results from the product





(for the private signal). In particular,
given a conjectured partition P(Ψ), they come from the product of elements of the set Qi, where
Ci(Ψ) ≡ P(Ψ).
Clearly, if we impose the condition that whenever, for some zi ∈ Qi and z′














, then l = l′ and for any zk (k = 1,...l) there exists a z′
h (h = 1,..,l′) such
20We use the symbol |C(Ψ)| to denote the cardinality of the set.
19that zk = z′
h, we have that the ABEE is unique: it is the equilibrium in which P(Ψ) is the ﬁnest
partition (i.e., whose elements are all singletons). Indeed, under this condition, if we start from
a partition in which each action is chosen only for one sequence of signal realizations, we then
verify that this is indeed the case. No other conjecture on the partition would be veriﬁed, since
the condition guarantees that each sequence of realizations leads to a diﬀerent action. Finally, note
that the condition under which the ABEE is unique is generically satisﬁed: therefore, our ABEE is
unique for almost all (q1,...qT).21
5.2 The case of signals of equal precision
We now want to consider the case in which the precisions of the signals are all identical, so that
assumption (A1) is violated. We will show that in this case the existence of an ABEE is not
guaranteed, which justiﬁes the choice of the genericity assumption (A1) in the ﬁrst place.22
To see this, we consider a simple example with T = 3 and in which the precision is equal to 0.7
for all signals. As a ﬁrst step, we try to construct an equilibrium based on our usual conjecture
that, for any two diﬀerent sequences of signal realizations, an agent chooses two distinct actions.
We will see that this conjecture is actually incorrect.
Following the reasoning of the previous sections, time 1 agent would choose 0.3 or 0.7 upon
receiving s1 = 0 or s2 = 1. Under the maintained conjecture, agent 2 would then choose 0.15517
or 0.5 or 0.84483. Consider now agent 3’s decision after observing a1 = 0.3, a2 = 0.5 and a
private signal s3 = 0. Under our conjecture, he would double count the signal leading to the




(0.7)2. Note, however, that this is the same likelihood ratio of an agent at time 2
after a1 = 0.3 and s2 = 0. Therefore, the conjecture would not be veriﬁed, since the same action
0.15517 would be chosen after {s1 = 0, s2 = 0} as well as after {s1 = 0, s2 = 1,s3 = 0}. Note
also that, if, instead, we conjectured that action 0.15517 is chosen after {s1 = 0, s2 = 0} as well
as after {s1 = 0, s2 = 1,s3 = 0}, agent 3, using our equilibrium concept, would then compute
σ(a = 0.15517|ω) as equal to 1
3 Pr(s1 = 0,s2 = 0|ω) + 1
3 Pr(s1 = 0,s2 = 1,s3 = 0|ω). Therefore, he
would not anymore have a likelihood ratio of
(0.3)2(0.7)(0.3)
(0.7)2(0.3)(0.7) and would not anymore choose 0.15517,
21This condition is slightly stronger than the condition used in the previous analysis. Indeed, the genericity
assumption of Section 2 can be derived form this by considering only the ﬁnest partition, since in that case the





22Obviously, we can choose precisions arbitrarily close to each other and still satisfy (A1).
20making the conjecture wrong again.
But even more is true. We have veriﬁed that whatever partition of the set Ψ = {(s1,..,st)|t =
1,2,3} one conjectures, the consistency requirement is never satisﬁed.23 In other words, this is an
example in which no ABEE exists.
We conjecture that restricting attention to the equal precision case, for generic values of q an
ABEE would fail to exist. This does not contradict the previous existence results by Jehiel (2005)
and Jehiel and Koessler (2008), since they consider cases in which the space of actions is ﬁnite.
What causes the inexistence of an ABEE in our framework is that the action space is continuous.
6 Beyond the Canonical Model
So far we have presented the model of social learning with continuous action space in its simplest
form. Now we discuss other variants of the model, thereby shedding more light on the robustness
of our results. Throughout this Section, we maintain our assumption (A1).
6.1 Unknown Order of Play
The social learning literature in the tradition of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) has sometimes been
criticized on the ground that it assumes agents know in which order all previous actions have been
chosen (see, e.g., Smith and Sørensen, 2008). We now remove this assumption and discuss the case
of an unknown order of play: agents know the previous actions, but not the order in which they were





23The set Ψ contains 14 elements, and the number of partitions P(Ψ) is obviously huge. The analysis is, however,
simpliﬁed by two considerations. First, after any sequence belonging to the set which included s1 = 0 (s1 = 1) the
consistency requires that the chosen action is 0.3 (0.7). Second, since the aim is to prove an inconsistency, ﬁnding it
for two elements of a conjectured partition is already enough. Since these two elements can belong to many partitions,
this considerably reduced the number of cases one has to study. The complete analysis is tedious but simple, and is
available on request from the authors.
24In the literature there are other papers that study similar set ups. Collander and Horner (2009) analyze the case
in which agents have to make a binary decision after receiving signals of diﬀerent precision and observing only the
total number of previous agents who have opted for either alternative (and not the order in which decisions where
taken). They show that in some cases, in equilibrium, agents follow the minority action. Guarino et al. (2007) study
the case in which only one of two possible actions is observable. For instance agents can observe the number of
previous investments, but not the number of predecessors who had the opportunity to invest and passed on it. They
show that only a cascade on the observable action can occur. Larson (2008) analyzes a situation in which agents
observe the average action of a population of their predecessors (before making a choice in a continuous action space).
21where a(i) is the action taken by one of t’s predecessors. In other words, the true sequence of actions
can be any permutation of this set. Our basic construction of an ABEE is robust to this change of
observational assumptions.
Proposition 4 When the order of play is unknown, there exists an ABEE in which, after a
sequence of signals s1,s2,...,st, agent t chooses action a∗















This result is a simple consequence of the way inferences are formed in an ABEE. Given that
agents conjecture that the distributions of actions are independently distributed across periods
(with a diﬀerent distribution for each state), knowing in which order actions have been chosen has
no eﬀect on the updated belief, which in turn implies that an ABEE when the order of actions is
unknown remains an ABEE when the order is known.
We note that the same robustness would also hold for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
although for a quite diﬀerent reason. In the perfect rationality case and under our genericity
assumption, agents can infer the order of actions, as diﬀerent order of moves would result in
diﬀerent actions. This in turn implies that the PBE found when the order of moves is observed
remains a PBE when this order is not observed.
6.2 Observing Only Some Predecessors
Assume now that each agent can only observe the action taken by some predecessors. We are not
the ﬁrst ones to discuss this case. C ¸elen and Kariv (2004) have studied social learning when agents
can only observe their immediate predecessor’s action.25 Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and Smith
and Sørensen (2008) have studied, in diﬀerent contexts, the case in which agents observe random
samples of past actions.26 We analyze both cases.
The focus of the study is on the speed of learning.
25In this study, agents can only choose between two actions. The result is that behavior does not settle on a single
action. Long periods of herding (i.e., conformity of actions) are observed, but switches to the other action occur. As
time passes, the periods of herding become longer and longer, and the switches increasingly rare.
26Smith and Sørensen (2008) study a sequential decision model in which agents can only observe unordered random
samples from predecessors’ actions (e.g., because of word of mouth communication) before making a binary decision.
With unbounded private signals complete learning eventually obtains in their model. Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)
present a model in which, at every time, a continuum of agents choose a binary action after observing a sample of
previous decisions (and, possibly, of signals on the outcomes). This can be interpreted as a model of word of mouth
22Observing Only the Immediate Predecessor
In the case in which agents can only observe the action of their immediate predecessor, we get
that the ABEE coincides with the PBE.
Proposition 5 When agents can only observe their immediate predecessor’s action, there exists an
ABEE (and a unique PBE) in which, after a sequence of signals s1,s2,...,st, agent t chooses action
a∗
t = α(s1,s2,...,st) (aPBE
















The intuition for this result is very simple. In the original analysis of Section 3, signal 1 has
weight t−1 since it enters the Bayesian updating through the observation of agent 1’s action, agent
2’s action...up to agent t−1’s action. Similarly for the other signals. Here, instead, a signal in the
sequence (s1,...,st−1) is counted only once, since it enters the Bayesian updating through the only
observation available to agent t, which is the action taken by agent t − 1.27
Observing Only n Predecessors
From the previous discussion it should be clear that the equivalence between the ABEE and PBE
(i.e., the lack of bias in an ABEE) is a special result of the case in which only one predecessor is
observed. As soon as more than one predecessor is observed, some form of bias reappears. The
reason is that when more than one predecessor’s action is observed, the same signal may be counted
more than once. Here, in the interest of space, we refrain from providing a detailed analysis. In
a working paper version of the paper, we illustrate both the case in which agents can observe the
actions of their n immediate predecessors, and that in which they can observe an unordered sample
of n predecessors’ actions.
6.3 More Actions at the Same Time
In all the previous analysis, we have adopted the traditional sequential decision model, and assumed
that at each time t one agent only makes a decision. Our set up, however, is ﬂexible enough
to accommodate the case in which several agents make their decisions simultaneously. Nothing
substantial changes in our ABEE, although, obviously, we have now to redeﬁne the history of
communication in large populations. The authors ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions (on the sampling rule, etc.) for herding to
arise, and conditions for all agents to settle on the correct choice.
27A similar observation is made in Eyster and Rabin (2008) in the context of their solution concept, from which
they interestingly infer that letting agents observe less may be beneﬁcial to agents when these are boundedly rational.
The same conclusion applies to our form of bounded rationality too.




, where ai,j denotes one of the ni actions at time i.
It is easy to show that one can construct an ABEE exactly as in the main analysis, conjecturing
that, for any two diﬀerent sequences of signal realizations, an agent chooses two distinct actions
and then observing that our genericity assumption on the signal precisions veriﬁes it. Similarly one
can show that there exists a unique PBE in which each action reveals the signal to the subsequent
agents. For space constraints we do not present a formal analysis. It is, however, clear that in
this set up the bias will be even higher than in the standard set up, since more signals will be
overweighted, and, furthermore, the overweight will be higher. For instance, at time 3 any signal
s1,j will be overcounted by all agents acting at that time. Furthermore, now it will be counted not
twice (as in the main analysis) but n2+1 times: once through the observation of action a1,j, and n2
times through the observation of all actions at time 2.28 At time 4 it will be counted n3n2 +n2 +1
by agents acting at that time, with the ﬁrst term reﬂecting the count of the signal through the
observation of the n3 actions at time 3.29 The reasoning generalizes to any time t.
7 Social Learning with Discrete Action Space
The previous analysis has shown how coarse inference biases agents’ decisions, and aﬀects the
process of social learning when the action space is continuous. An obvious question is what happens
in the case in which agents can only choose in a discrete action space. This is, indeed, the set up
ﬁrst analyzed in the social learning literature in the canonical model of Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
In Bikhchandani et al. (1992) model, each agent receives a signal of precision q ∈ (0.5,1) and
chooses an action in {0,1}. We ﬁrst consider this simple case (mainly for completeness’s sake) and
then we will consider the case of signals of unbounded precision, which is our main interest. All the
other aspects of the model are identical to those described in Section 2. An ABEE can be deﬁned
in this set up analogously to the previous, continuous action, case: agents make their inferences
simply based on the frequencies of actions a = 0,1 in the two states ω = 0,1. This means that we
can deﬁne




ht,st σt(a = i|ht,st) σ(ht,st|ω)
T
,
for i = 0,1 as the aggregate distribution of actions given the state of the world ω.
28Indeed, each action ai,j at time 2 is only taken after a speciﬁc sequence {s1,1,s1,2,..,s1,n1,s2,i}.
29Each action at time 3 is only taken after a speciﬁc sequence {s1,1,s1,2,..,s1,n1,s2,1,s2,2,..,s2,n2,s2,i}.
247.1 The Case of Bounded Beliefs
In the model of Bikhchandani et al. (1992), in equilibrium, agents follow their private signals,
unless their predecessors having chosen one option outnumber those in favor of the other by at
least two.30 This is the case in which an informational cascade (i.e., a situation in which agents
neglect their private information) arises.
We now show that, when agents make inferences according to the payoﬀ relevant analogy rea 
soning, there exists a unique ABEE in which an informational cascade starts already at time 2,
with the ﬁrst agent choosing the action dictated by his signal and all the following ones imitating
him.31
Proposition 6 Suppose agents receive a signal of the same precision q ∈ (0.5,1). There exists a
unique ABEE in which the ﬁrst agent in the sequence chooses the action according to his signal
(a∗
1 = s1) and all the following agents imitate him (a∗
t = a∗
1 for all t).
The proof that such an ABEE exists is very simple. The ﬁrst agent obviously follows his own
signal. Consider now the following agents. If all agents play according to the strategy indicated in
the proposition, the aggregate distribution of actions as a function of the state of the world ω is given
by σ(a = 1|ω = 1) = σ(a = 0|ω = 0) = q. Indeed, given the strategy, all actions will be identical.
Whenever the ﬁrst agent chooses the correct action (a = ω) (which occurs with probability q), so
will everyone else; whenever he chooses the incorrect one (which occurs with probability 1−q), so
will all the following decision makers. Since agents only consider this aggregate distribution, they


















30This is true under any tie breaking rule such that, if indiﬀerent, an agent plays the action in agreement with his
signal with some positive probability.
31In existing experiments on Bikhchandani et al. (1992), such a conformity of actions is typically not observed.
Given the documented tendency of subjects to put relatively more weight on their own signal, this is not surprising.
Still, in future work, it would be interesting to study how a modiﬁed version of our ABEE which includes the
possibility of errors in the laboratory (in the spirit of the Quantal Response Equilibrium) could ﬁt the data of the
existing experimental studies.





















for any agent t. Given these subjective beliefs, ignoring his own signal and following agent 1 is
weakly optimal for agent 2 and strictly optimal for all the others. These best responses clearly
make the beliefs on the aggregate distributions correct.
The proof that this is the unique ABEE is only slightly more complicated. Intuitively, in any
other ABEE, agents would consider the others’ action i either as strictly more informative than
their own signal, or as strictly less informative. In the Appendix, we show that in either case a
contradiction arises. For instance, if the action a = i is considered strictly more informative (i.e.,
σ(a = i|ω = i) > q), then each agent would simply imitate the ﬁrst agent. Following the argument
above, though, this would mean that σ(a = i|ω = i) would be equal to q, contradicting that a = i is
more informative than the own signal. On the other hand, if the action a = i is considered strictly
less informative (i.e., σ(a = i|ω = i) > q), then each agent would rely more on his own private
information and the resulting frequency of actions a = i in state ω = i could not be strictly lower
than q.
We note that in the unique ABEE identiﬁed in Proposition 6 agents’ beliefs put eventually
weight 1 on the state corresponding to the action chosen by the ﬁrst agent. This is of course very
diﬀerent from the beliefs in the full rationality case (which never exceed the belief arising from
having two signals in favor of the chosen state).
7.2 The Case of Unbounded Beliefs
We now modify the simple model, to allow for a more general structure of the private information
agents receive. In particular, we now assume that each agent t receives a signal of precision qt, where
qt is distributed on the support [0.5,1] according to a density function f(qt), and a distribution
function F(q) where we assume that f(.) is a continuous function with f(1) > 0. Note that we are
assuming the same density for all times t. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio
qt
1−qt has support [0,∞],
which means that the distribution of beliefs is unbounded. Since we want to take the length of the
sequence T explicitly into account, we ﬁnd it convenient to redeﬁne the aggregate distributions as
βT(ω) := σ(a = ω|ω).
26As a ﬁrst step in our analysis, we now establish an existence result:
Proposition 7 Suppose agents receive signals of precision qt distributed on the support [0.5,1]





The argument for the existence of an ABEE is standard in this ﬁnite environment (Jehiel, 2005;
Jehiel and Koessler, 2008). Here it is worth noting that in a symmetric equilibrium, given the
aggregate distribution β∗















where |a = i| denotes the number of times action i was chosen from period 1 to period t − 1 (so
that the sum |a = 1| + |a = 0| is obviously equal to t − 1). If this likelihood ratio is greater than
1, he chooses action 1, and if it is lower he chooses action 0. The decision of the agent to follow
the majority or not depends on the precision of his own signal. A very precise signal induces an
agent to follow private information independently of the consensus, even if the majority (i.e., the
absolute value of the diﬀerence |a = 1| − |a = 0|) is large.
Let us now move to the asymptotic properties of our economy. In particular, we want to prove
that, when T grows large, the actions cannot settle on the correct one with probability close to 1.
Note that if the actions settled on the correct one, an external, Bayesian, observer would learn the
true state of the world. In contrast, in our model, since there is no convergence of actions to the
correct one, there is no convergence of beliefs to the truth.
Proposition 8 Suppose agents receive signals of precision qt distributed on the support [0.5,1]
according to a density function f(qt). In this economy, there exists no ABEE such that, for T → ∞,
β∗
T(ω) −→ 1 for ω = 0 and ω = 1.
In the Appendix we show that assuming that β∗
T(ω) → 1 implies that the probability of taking
the incorrect action is bounded away from 0, thereby leading to a contradiction. Intuitively, if the
aggregate probability of the correct action converged to 1, it would mean that in an ABEE all agents
would disregard their own signal and follow the decision of the predecessors (unless they receive an
extremely precise signal against previous decisions). Since there is a strictly positive probability
(equal to 1−Eq1) that the ﬁrst agent makes the incorrect choice, this implies that the probability
27that everyone chooses the incorrect action would be bounded away from zero, contradicting the
convergence.
In order to understand better the asymptotic properties of our social learning problem, we
have simulated the equilibrium value of βT for various T assuming q is uniformly distributed on
(1
2,1).32 The equilibrium value β∗
T is approximately equal to 0.79 when T = 3, and changes only
slightly when we increase T. For large T, β∗
T tends towars 0.82. This means that there is a rather
signiﬁcant ineﬃciency, since approximately 18% of agents are making the wrong decision. Moreover,
the probability that the agent makes a mistake is approximately the same whether an agent acts
at time 10 or at time 200, since the impact of early actions becomes soon overwhelming.
It is instructive to compare our result to that in a model of fully rational agents. We know
from Smith and Sørensen (2000) that in a model like ours (with unbounded beliefs) but with fully
rational agents, beliefs converge to the truth and the actions settle on the correct one (see their
Theorems 1 and 3). The bias introduced by the coarse inference has, therefore, a strong long lasting
eﬀect, impeding complete learning. One may wonder what lays at the root of the diﬀerent results.
Intuitively, note that in the case of fully rational agents, unbounded precisions of signals have a
very powerful eﬀect for the decision of an agent and of his successors. Even after a large majority
of agents have chosen one alternative, an agent with a high precision signal that contradicts the
previous history chooses an action against the majority. The probability of this event is never
zero. Moreover, after observing the deviation of this agent, the following one will update his belief
knowing that the previous agent had received a very high precision signal. Also this agent could,
therefore, go against the majority even if he himself does not have a very precise signal. In our
model, in contrast, even if an agent receives a very precise signal and goes against the majority, the
following agent would not go against the majority unless he himself receives a very precise signal.
This is because by considering the aggregate distributions only, agents miss the inference that if
someone went against a strong majority it must be that he received a very precise signal.
8 Conclusion
Social learning in real economies is a fascinating and complex phenomenon. The models of rational
social learning have helped us in understanding many mechanisms through which people learn
32To ﬁnd the ﬁxed point, for a given βT we have set ω = 1 and simulated the agents’ choices according to the best
response described above. We have repeated the simulation 100,000 times. We have then computed the empirical
frequency of a = 1. We have repeated the procedure until the empirical frequency was indeed equal to βT.
28from others. They have shed light on phenomena such as fads, fashion and cultural change. While
we ﬁnd these models very insightful, in this paper we have oﬀered a new perspective, with less
demanding requirements on the rationality of people. Speciﬁcally, we have assumed that agents
make their inferences based only on how the aggregate distributions of individual actions diﬀer
across states rather than on more elaborate statistics that would allow the agents to diﬀerentiate
these distributions according to the various histories.
Our aim was not to attack all the aspects of rational social learning that one can ﬁnd problem 
atic, or all conclusions that one can ﬁnd implausible. We simply studied two environments (the case
of the continuous action space and that of unbounded signal precision) where the existing results
seem to require more investigation. In the continuous action space, where according to the standard
paradigm, history does not matter, we have found that early signals are assigned a higher weight,
a bias that echoes the intuitive idea that early choices may have lasting eﬀects in interactions with
social learning. In the case of unbounded precision of signals, we have found that the eﬀect of
deviators from the crowd is not as strong (and implausible) as implied by the overturning principle,
and the process of learning does not necessarily lead agents to settle on the correct action.
While understanding social learning in real economies is the ﬁnal aim, probably the most sensible
environment where to study it is the laboratory, given that our models are highly stylized. A vast
experimental literature has shown that the classical model of social learning of Bikhchandani et
al. (1992) is only partially successful in capturing the behavior human subjects exhibit in the
laboratory, and that important deviations from standard equilibrium predictions occur (see, e.g.,
the recent, comprehensive study by Weizs¨ acker, 2008). For instance, experimental subjects seem
to take into account that the predecessors’ actions are based on private information, but fail to
internalize completely that the predecessors also went through a similar process of inference from
others’ actions (see, e.g., K¨ ubler and Weizs¨ acker, 2004). The view resulting from these experiments
is consistent with our approach in which agents make their inferences based on a simple statistical
model (which relates the distribution of actions to the state) rather than by putting themselves
in the shoes of other agents. Clearly, further experiments (both for continuous action spaces and
varying precisions of signals) should be made to test the predictions of our model. This is left for
future research.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of convergence in the case of the PBE is standard (see, e.g., Shiryaev, 1996), and we







We prove the proposition in four steps.
Step 1. Consider a number a ∈ (p,1). By applying Chebychev’s inequality, we obtain













































































log((1 − q) + qeλi)
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where we use the fact that the random variables ui are independently distributed. Therefore, we
can conclude that





















Step 2. Now we rewrite this upper bound in a more convenient form. First, let us rewrite the
sum in the exponent as follows:
t  
i=1







log((1 − q) + qeλi) − λai
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When n gets large, the sum on the right hand side approaches the Riemann integral of the func 












(log((1 − q) + qemx) − amx)dx.
Hence, we can write







(amx − log((1 − q) + qemx))dx
 
.
32Step 3. Now we look for the m that makes the integral as large as possible, since we want to
make our upper bound tight. Note that the integrand f(y) = (ay − log((1 − q) + qey)) is strictly
concave, it takes value 0 when y = 0, it is then positive and eventually becomes negative. In
particular, for x = 1, it becomes zero in the point m∗ > 0 that solves am∗ = log(1−q +qem∗
). To
maximize the integral, we want to integrate the function under all its positive area. Therefore, we
have











Step 4. Finally, we ﬁnd ana approximation for the integral. The integrand f(y) is maximized










+ (1 − a)log
(1 − a)
(1 − q)
:= H(a) ≥ 0. Now, since (ay − log((1 − q) + qey)) is positive in the
interval (0,m∗), is concave and has a maximum value H(a), we can draw a triangle underneath it










H(a) ≥ m∗(a − q)2,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that H(p + x) ≥ 2x2.
Therefore, we can conclude that
Pr(Zt − q ≥ ε) ≤ e−nm∗
2 H(q+ε) ≤ e−nm∗ε2
.
Analogous arguments show that
Pr(Zt − q ≤ −ε) ≤ e−nm∗
2 H(q−ε) ≤ e−nm∗ε2
.
Finally, we can conclude that
P(|Zt − q| ≥ ε) ≤ 2e−nm∗ε2
.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove the result for the ABEE, let us consider the decision problem of agent 3 (the decision
problem of agents 1 and 2 is of course identical to that already discussed above, since there is




, not knowing which action
has been taken ﬁrst. Recall that, by our conjecture, the optimal action a∗
t is only taken after one
33sequence of signals, that is, a∗
t = α(s1,s2,...,st). Therefore, the ﬁrst action is actually only taken
after a speciﬁc realization of s1 and the second after a speciﬁc sequence of realizations s1 and s2.
Since the agent considers the aggregate distribution given a particular state of the world, he will








depending on whether a(1) = a1 or a(1) = a2. (A similar expression obviously holds for a(2).) It
should be clear that the agent does not really know whether a(1) is the ﬁrst or the second action,
but he knows the probability with which that particular action is taken conditional on the state of
the world. And this is the information he uses to update his belief. Therefore agent 3’s likelihood




 σ(a1|ω = 1) σ(a2|ω = 1)
 σ(a1|ω = 0) σ(a2|ω = 0)
m(s3) =
Pr(s1|ω = 1)Pr(s1,s2|ω = 1)
Pr(s1|ω = 0)Pr(s1,s2|ω = 0)
m(s3),
which is exactly the same expression obtained in the original analysis. An identical argument shows
that the likelihood ratio is the same as that obtained in the original analysis for any agent t.
Let us now prove the result for the PBE. Let us consider the decision problem of agent 3.




have been taken, he can infer






















Only one of the two observed actions can be the ﬁrst in the sequence, since only one will be





. Indeed, by our














Therefore, agent 3 will be able to infer which action was taken ﬁrst, and his updating problem will
be identical to the one discussed in the main analysis. He will make his decision exactly as if he
observed the order of the sequence. A similar logic applies to the decision problem of agent 4. Again,
our genericity assumption guarantees that only one action actually taken by the predecessors will
be consistent with one of the two possible likelihood ratios given by the ﬁrst signal with precision
34q1. This will allow agent 4 to infer which action is aPBE
1 . Then, only one action taken by the two









. This will allow the agent to infer which action was aPBE
2 and, by exclusion,
which one was aPBE
3 . Therefore, agent 4 will perfectly infer the sequence of actions and make his
decision in the same way as if he observed the entire sequence. Similarly for any agent t.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 5
For the ﬁrst two agents in the sequence, of course, nothing changes. Let us discuss how agent 3
makes his decision in an ABEE. After observing action a2 = α(s1,s2) and the private signal s3 the




































for the PBE Since the argument is similar to those presented above, and fairly standard, we
refrain from providing a formal proof.
359.4 Proof of Proposition 6
To prove that the ABEE is unique we proceeed by contradiction. Suppose that σ(a = i|ω = i) > q,
for i = 0 or 1 (or both). Then agents would perceive others’ action i as more informative than their
own signal. This implies that if the ﬁrst agent chooses a = i, all agents would follow the ﬁrst agent’s
action, independently of their signal, yielding in turn σ(a = i|ω = i) = q, which is a contradiction.
Suppose now that σ(a = 0|ω = 0) = σ(a = 1|ω = 1) = q < q. Then an agent would follow his
own signal, unless the predecessors who have chosen one action outnumber the others by at least







1−q. In this case, a
cascade arises, and an agent just follows the majority action, independently of his signal. Now, if
k(q) ≥ T, a cascade cannot occur and the agents always follow their private signals. Therefore, the
probability of action a = i in state ω = i is equal to q for any time and any history, which implies that
σ(a = i|ω = i) = q, a contradiction. If, instead, k(q) < T, then σ(a = i|ω = i) > q, yielding again
a contradiction.33 The remaining case in which σ(a = 0|ω = 0) = q < q and σ(a = 1|ω = 1) = q
(or vice versa) can also be immediately ruled out based on the same considerations.
9.5 Proof of Proposition 7
We want to show the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in which βT(0) = βT(1) ≡ βT ∈ (1/2,1).
The argument is standard. Let us deﬁne the function φ : [0.5,1] → [0.5,1] that, for a given βT,
gives the aggregate distribution of actions conditional on a state of the world, φ(βT). We want to
prove that there exists a βT such that βT = φ(βT). Recall that for a given βT the best response of











33To show that σ(a = i|ω = i) > q it is enough to observe that a correct cascade is more likely than an incorrect
one. Formally, at any time t ≤ k(q), the probability that a = ω is equal to q for any history. Consider now
t = k(q) + 1. There are three possibilities: either a correct cascade (i.e., a cascade in which an agent chooses a = ω
with probability 1) arises; or an incorrect cascade arises; or there is no cascade (in which case the probability that







q , but this does not aﬀect the conclusion.)
Now, we can show that at time t = k(q) + 1 the probability of observing a = ω is greater than q. Indeed, the
probability of observing a = ω is equal to
￿
1 − q




k(q). This probability is higher than q when
(1 − q
k(q) − (1 − q)
k(q)) + q
k(q)−1 > 0, which is always satisﬁed since q ∈ (0.5,1). Similarly, one can prove that any
time t > k(q) + 1 the probability of a = ω is again greater than q. Therefore, σ(a = i|ω = i) > q.
36is greater (lower) than 1.
Consider, ﬁrst, the case of βT = 1/2. In this case, other agents’ decisions are perceived as
uninformative. Therefore, each agent just follows his private signal. As a result, the aggregate
distribution of a = ω will be φ(βT) = E(qt) > (1/2,1), which implies that φ(βT) > βT. Consider,
now, the case of βT = 1. In this case, other agents’ decisions are perceived as perfectly informative.
Therefore, after the ﬁrst agent chooses (by following his own signal), all the others simply imitate
him. As a result, the aggregate distribution of a = ω will be again φ(βT) = E(q) ∈ (1/2,1), which
implies that φ(βT) < βT. Finally, notice that, at any time t, the probability that an agent receiving





≥ 1 and is 1−F(β
|a=ω|−|a=1−ω|
T ) otherwise. Since
qt is distributed according to a continuous density function, φ(βT) is a continuous function. By
Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem, there exists a βT ∈ (1/2,1) such that φ(βT) = βT.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 8
Without loss of generality, suppose the state of the world is ω = 0. Suppose β∗
T(0) →   β, for
  β = 1 − ε, and for a small ε.
First, note that if β∗
T(0) →   β, then an agent receiving a signal of precision qt <   β will always
follow the majority. Indeed, if there is a majority in favor of one action, it means that there is at
least one more predecessor in favor of such an action. Consider the least favorable case in which








, where I takes
value 1 if the majority action is 1 and −1 if it is 0. This likelihood ratio will be higher or lower
than 1 (and so the action chosen by the agent will be either 1 or 0) depending only on the choice
of the predecessors, since qt <   β. The argument will hold a fortiori if the majority is by a number
greater than one.
Now, we ﬁnd a lower bound for the probability of the incorrect action. Consider the event that
the ﬁrst agent receives the signal s1 = 1 (an event that occurs with probability 1−Eq1). The ﬁrst
agent obviously chooses a1 = 1. Now, consider the second agent. If he receives the signal s2 = 1,
obviously he chooses a2 = 1. If he observes s2 = 0, he chooses a2 = 1 with the same probability
as the probability that q2 <   β, F(  β), as we know from the previous reasoning. Using Taylor’s
expansion, it is easy to show that this probability is F(  β) > 1 − 2f(1)ε, for ε < ε and some ε > 0.
Similarly, if the third agent receives the signal s2 = 1, obviously he chooses a3 = 1. If he observes
s3 = 0, he chooses a3 = 1 with a probability equal to F(  β
2
). Using again Taylor’s expansion, it is
37easy to prove that this probability is greater than 1−4f(1)ε2 for ε < ε, and some ε > 0. A similar
analysis proves that if agent t observes st = 0, he chooses at = 1 with a probability not lower than
1 − 2t−1f(1)εt.











































This expression is close to (1 − Eq1) > 0 for ε close to zero, thus contradicting that β∗
T(0) →   β =
1 − ε.
38Figure 1: Average distance of the public belief from the fundamental value. The solid line
refers to the PBE. The dotted line refers to the ABEE.
Figure 2: Average distance of the public belief from the fundamental value after 5 incorrect
signals. The solid line refers to the PBE. The dotted line refers to the ABEE.
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